Wednesday, October 27, 2010

Stalinist Russia Grad Class Papers #11


Russia's War: A History of the Soviet Effort: 1941-1945


Richard Overy
Paperback: 432 pages
Published: 1998
ISBN-10: 0140271694



  • Richard Overy’s Russia’s War is a brief historical work about the Soviet fight in the Second World War from the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the Soviet-Finnish war to the Potsdam Conference and the Nuremberg trial and the events that sowed the seeds of the Cold War. The overarching argument put forward by the author is one of the brutality of the Soviet regime and the draconian methods of terror and control it exercised over its population before, during and even after the war. Nonetheless, Overy clearly states that the reason for the Soviet victory is multifaceted. Patriotism and dedication of ordinary soldiers and factory workers perhaps played the most significant role, however, talented military leadership and successful strategy, huge increase in military production of weapons and tanks, Allied assistance, and miscalculations on the part of the German leadership sealed Soviet victory in World War II. 




Richard Overy sets the context of the Soviet involvement in the war by familiarizing the reader with the nature of the Bolshevik regime from the Civil War and collectivization and mass industrialization to the Great Terror. It is clear that the Soviet regime was merciless and brutal in the way it treated its own citizens in Gulags and the propaganda lies it generated during and after the war. Stalin signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact behind the back of his allies which lead to the Polish invasion, the Soviet troops committed massive atrocities against the Polish military officers in the Katyn forest as well as against German civilians as they advanced toward Berlin. Desertion or retreat was harshly punished by the regime, often by execution. Soviet civilians, including women and children, worked eighteen hour days with hardly any rest to contribute to the war effort either by digging trenches or working in factories. 

The author argues that against the iron grip of the regime, the Soviet victory was not possible through terror alone. In fact, the remarkable turn around in Soviet fortunes that started with the battle of Stalingrad and culminated with the taking of Berlin, taking into the account the state of the military preparedness of the USSR at the eve of the invasion in 1941 bordered on impossible. One of the main reasons for the successful effort at stopping the enemy and pushing it back is the selfless sacrifice and the ferocious fighting of the ordinary Russian solider who fought to death protecting his fatherland from the German invader. After a few unsuccessful efforts at conducting the war Stalin backed away and let the military genius of Zhukov, Konev and Rossokovsky, as well as others to come up with and execute the war strategy. The General Staff also learned from German tactics and mistakes and after a few years became familiar with the way the Germans fought the war. Even Stalin came to appreciate the way the modern warfare was conducted. Democratization in the army, encouragement of responsibility and diminishing of the role of the party in the military affairs lead to increased efficiency in the armed forces.

Factories, along with its workers, relocated to the safety of the remoteness of Siberia were mass producing weaponry at the expense of consumer goods and other industry. This was possible as the U.S. provided aid through the Lend-Lease program supplied food, consumer goods, field telephones, radio receivers, jeeps, motorcycles, etc. Victory on the battle field was decisive in the way the war unfolded. The victories of 1943 were won at a high cost in lives, although the cost was very much less than it had been a year before. For example, Stalingrad cost the lives of 470,000 soldiers and airmen whereas the battle of Kursk was won with 70,000 dead.  

Hitler, like Stalin who often did not listen to his generals, made several tactical mistakes that proved to be fatal. German intelligence was often ignored or the front of the Soviet counter offensive was completely misjudged which resulted in Soviet assault on the areas least defended. Overy writes that “out of 34.5 million men and women mobilized an incredible 84 percent were killed, wounded or captured.”  The exact number of those who perished might never be known, but it is believed that the total Soviet war dead may have been as high as 25 million – one quarter higher than the official figure of 20 million announced by Khrushchev in 1956.  This clearly shows the incredible cost of human lives that was sacrificed for victory by the Soviet people. Although they fought courageously, it seems that they were accustomed to a repressive system designed to push them to the brink, which eventually pushed the Soviets over the hump to defeat the Nazis. 


Dr. W: never gave me this paper back

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