Stalinist Russia Grad Class Papers #12

Stalin's Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939-1953

Geoffrey Roberts
Paperback: 496 pages
Published: 2008
ISBN-10: 0300136226

Stalin’s Wars is a controversial book by Geoffrey Roberts about Joseph Stalin’s role as s military and political leader of the Soviet Union during the Second World War and more generally, about his decision making and policies from the time of the Nazi-Soviet pact of August 1939 to the postwar negotiations with the Grand Alliance, domestic reconstruction, and anti-West drift that solidified the Cold War tensions. The author’s argument is threefold: he believes that Stalin was a very “effective and highly successful war leader,” that he tried really hard to preserve the Alliance after the war, and finally that Stalin’s domestic regime of the post-war years was not as brutal as compared to the pre-war period. 

One of the most controversial claims by the author is his attempt to dispel the myth of Stalin as an incompetent war leader who does not deserve any credit for the Soviet victory over the Nazis. Roberts explicitly states that the countless crimes bordering on genocide that Stalin authorized and indirectly committed against his own people should not be denied or exonerated.  However, Stalin’s extraordinary ability to adopt, as well as his political and military acumen, his ability to learn from his mistakes and his flexibility tipped the balance of the war to the Soviet side and saved the world from Hitler.

Geoffrey Roberts believes that such a negative view of Stalin’s role during WWII and the aversion and disgust to anything associated with his name is undoubtedly linked to the terror of his rule, and is also the legacy of de-Stalinization undertaken by the Soviet leadership following his death. Stalin’s name became scarcely mentioned in the press and his body removed from the mausoleum where it was laid next to Vladimir Lenin himself. In the post-Stalinist era the Soviet propaganda placed more and more emphasis on the individual sacrifices and courage of ordinary soldiers and the Soviet people as a whole in the war effort against the German aggressor and lauded the skill and military genius of the top generals. It is not surprising, the author argues, that after many years of brainwashing, censorship and propaganda a whole new interpretation of what went on during the war has entered the Soviet psyche and entrenched itself not only in ordinary people’s minds but also became a standard view among many historians.

The depth and detail with which the author describes the events in this book support his argument because he is able to back his claim with specific examples rather than making sweeping broad generalizations about Stalin without concrete evidence that is often made by historians who paint the Soviet war effort in broad general brushstrokes. For example, by examining Zhukov’s and Vasilevskii’s memoirs and comparing them against other evidence such as Stalin’s appointment diary and other sources, the author is able to show inaccuracies and self-serving claims made by many influential people, especially after the de-Stalinization as well as in the late ’80s and early ’90s as the USSR began to crumble.  In fact, the author skillfully demonstrates the plethora of false claims ranging from the authorship of successful operation to Stalin’s secret plan to sign a separate peace agreement with Germany. Most importantly Stalin’s ability to learn from previous mistakes, his pragmatism – he stuck by and listened to his generals  – and his leadership albeit tyrannical proved decisive in the winning of the war. The author does not claim that Stalin did not make mistakes. For example, the discussion of the occupation of post-war Germany and the spheres of interest at Potsdam is a rare example of Stalin being tactically outsmarted in a diplomatic negotiation.

By focusing on detail Roberts presents a picture that is suddenly more complex and multifaceted than the fuzzy image one might form looking at the big picture of the Soviet war effort and Stalin’s role at commanding the front. Stalin certainly made mistakes, but he was also a very skilled political leader and where he lacked knowledge or experience he successfully delegated it to his subordinates allowing for a degree of creative freedom. This image of Stalin is difficult to accept for some, and it does not mean that the war was won because of him nor that a democratically elected leader would have been less successful at waging the war against the most well equipped and trained army in the world. What this does show us is that the truth is not necessarily black or white and that we should keep our minds open to ideas that do not necessarily fit what we want to believe. 

This was the last paper I submitted into the black hole known as the academe